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Family representatives in family firms 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Manuscript type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: Family control in family firms can extend beyond the direct 
involvement of family members, but identifying these mechanisms is difficult in most 
markets. We utilize unique disclosures made by Taiwanese firms to examine the role played 
by family representatives in listed family firms. Family representatives are non-family 
members that represent the controlling family’s indirect shareholdings in the firm. We 
examine whether family representatives are used in the same manner as family members and 
whether they provide net benefits or costs to shareholders.  
Research Findings/Insights: In our sample of listed family firms, we find that omitting 
family representatives understates the influence of controlling families by 46%. We show that 
family representatives are associated with net costs to shareholders, but to a lesser extent than 
family members. We also find that controlling families use family members and family 
representatives differently. Family members are more involved in older family firms and in 
firms founded by the family. Family representatives are more involved in acquired and 
second generation family firms and in larger firms with more fixed assets.  
Theoretical/Academic Implications: In family firms with indirect ownership, our analysis 
suggests that family representatives are being used by controlling families to extend their 
influence within their firms, to the detriment of minority shareholders.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, our analysis shows that disclosure of 
family member and representative relationships within firms is important and value-relevant 
to investors. Furthermore, our results suggest that firm performance could be improved by 
limiting the involvement of family members and family representatives in family firms.  
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Family Firms, Family Members, Family Representatives, 
Firm Performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies of listed firms around the world indicate that family firms are widespread 
and possibly the predominant type of listed firm (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002). In family firms, controlling families can utilize individuals affiliated 
with the family to extend their influence within the firm. However, in most markets 
identifying these individuals is difficult as firms are not required to disclose this information. 
In this study we use unique disclosures made by listed firms in Taiwan, where both family 
and representative relationships are disclosed in annual reports, to examine the role played by 
family representatives in family firms. Family representatives are non-family members who 
act as representatives of the controlling family’s indirect shareholdings in the firm.1 
 Prior studies have investigated the economic benefits and costs of family involvement 
in family firms and find that there are situations where there are net benefits (e.g. founder 
family CEO) and net costs (e.g. excess control rights) to minority shareholders (Claessens et 
al., 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; 
Maury, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). However, when examining the extent of family 
involvement in family firms, these studies have generally focused on the positions held by 
family members. Two prior studies have used a more comprehensive approach to family 
involvement, by identifying all directorships directly controlled by the family (Yeh and 
Woidtke, 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2009). They show that controlling families can utilize 
their indirect shareholdings to control more board positions than those held by family 
members, but they do not differentiate between family members and family representatives in 
these positions.  
 In this study, we specifically focus on family representatives because they are a clear 
example of individuals being used by controlling families to extend their influence within the 
firm. They are not family members, but they have a documented tie to the controlling family - 
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they have been entrusted by the controlling family to represent the family’s indirect 
shareholdings in the firm. Family representatives can therefore be considered as an extension 
of family control, with family representatives expected to act, to some extent at least, in the 
interests of the controlling family, rather than the interests of minority shareholders. From an 
agency cost perspective, family representatives represent a potential agency cost to minority 
shareholders, with the magnitude of this agency cost dependent on how closely the interests 
of family representatives are aligned with those of the controlling family.  
 The two main research questions we pursue in this study are whether family 
representatives are used in the same manner as family members and whether family 
representatives are associated with net benefits or costs to shareholders. We hypothesise that 
family members and family representatives are used differently by controlling families, with 
their use related to a number of firm characteristics. We expect firm age and the generation of 
the family firm to be positively related to family member involvement as there is more 
chance for the family to expand through birth and marriage (Fiegener, 2010). In family 
business groups, we expect firms closer to the family (i.e. founded by the family and with 
less indirect ownership) are likely to have more family member involvement and firms 
further away from the family (i.e. acquired by the family and with greater indirect ownership) 
are likely to have more family representative involvement. We also expect the involvement of 
family members and family representatives to be related to firm complexity and monitoring 
needs (Boone et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008). We expect to find more 
involvement by both family members and representatives in larger firms, which have greater 
overall monitoring needs. However, when monitoring is relatively easier (firms with more 
fixed assets), we expect more involvement by family representatives, as family members 
effectively outsource this monitoring to family representatives so they can concentrate on 
other activities.  
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 We use agency and stewardship theories to examine whether family representatives 
are associated with net benefits or costs to shareholders. From an agency cost perspective, we 
expect family representatives to be an agency concern to minority shareholders, but to a 
lesser extent than family members. This is because the interests of family representatives are 
expected to be somewhat aligned with the interests of the controlling family – more closely 
than the interests of outsiders, but to a lesser extent than family members. However, under 
stewardship theory, family representatives may also provide benefits to shareholders, but 
again to a lesser extent than family members. For example, family representatives are likely 
to have a longer term view than outsiders, as they may expect a life-long career in the 
family’s firms, but their longer term view is not expected to be as long as the inter-
generational view of the controlling family. Ultimately, whether family representatives 
provide net benefits or costs to shareholders, and how this relates to the net benefits or costs 
of family members, is an empirical question, which we investigate in our analysis.  
This study provides three contributions to the literature. First, prior studies have either 
focused on family member involvement (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Fiegener, 2010) or a more comprehensive measure of family involvement that includes 
all positions directly controlled by the family (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 
2009). However, there has been no comparison between these two measures. In this study we 
ask two important questions. How much does family member involvement underestimate 
total family involvement? Do the results of our analysis differ between these two measures of 
family involvement? These questions are important as numerous studies have documented 
widespread indirect ownership (which is the basis for the use of family representatives) by 
controlling families around the world (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2009). We find that solely focusing on family member involvement 
understates (by 46%) the influence of controlling families in family firms. In both our 
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analysis of the determinants of family involvement and the effects of family involvement on 
firm performance, we find that results differ between the two measures. This suggests that 
studies that focus solely on family member involvement are likely to underestimate the 
overall influence that controlling families have in their firms.  
Second, we investigate whether controlling families use family members and family 
representatives differently. This progresses the work of Yeh and Woidtke (2005) by 
differentiating between family members and family representatives, rather than assuming that 
their use is the same. We find that family members and family representatives are used 
differently. Controlling families tend to use family members or family representatives across 
firm positions. In particular, we find that family members are more involved in older family 
firms and in firms founded by the family. Family representatives are more involved in 
acquired and second generation family firms, and when more monitoring is required but is 
not overly difficult (i.e. larger firms with more fixed assets). 
 Third, in our performance analysis we are the first to examine whether family 
representatives provide net benefits or costs to shareholders. We show that family 
representatives (particularly family representative directors) are associated with net costs to 
minority shareholders, but to a lesser extent than family members. This indicates that family 
representatives are an agency concern to minority shareholders, albeit a smaller concern than 
family members (particularly descendent family members).  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The literature review and hypothesis 
development section provides further details about family representatives, summarizes the 
relevant literature and develops our hypotheses. The data and variables section describes our 
sample selection and provides variable definitions and descriptive statistics. The empirical 
analysis section details and discusses our results. Conclusions and limitations are provided in 
the final section.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Family Representatives 
The term, family representatives, is new to the family firm and family business literatures. 
Our specific definition of a family representative is provided in the preceding section. Here, 
we provide more detail on who we consider is and isn’t a family representative. Theoretically, 
it is possible to consider all employees and directors of a family firm or family business to be 
working for the controlling family and hence representing the interests of the family. While 
this is more likely to be true in small, unlisted family businesses, where there are fewer 
employees and the business is 100% family owned, it is less likely to be true in large, listed 
family firms, where there are hundreds (or thousands) of employees and there are a large 
number of non-family shareholders. In this paper, we do not use such as wide definition of 
family representatives. Our definition of family representatives is limited to non-family 
members that act as representatives of the indirect shareholdings of the controlling family.  
 Figure 1 provides an example of family representative involvement in U-Ming Marine 
Transport Corporation in 2007. The Hsu family controls the Far Eastern Group and uses their 
indirect family shareholdings, through five companies in the group, to appoint 7 
representatives (including 1 family member) to the board of U-Ming Marine Transport 
Corporation. Two further board positions are held by the Hsu family through the direct 
shareholdings of family members. The final three board positions are held by other directors 
with no documented affiliation to the family. Therefore, of the 12 positions on the board, 
three are held by family members and six are held by family representatives. The three family 
members include the founder’s two sons and one grandson. The six family representatives are 
non-family members that represent the shareholdings of other entities within the Far Eastern 
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Group. In general, family representatives are directors or managers in these other family-
controlled entities.  
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
 To better understand whom we classify as a family representative, perhaps it is easier 
to explain who is not a family representative. A family representative is not a family member, 
not an independent director, not a non-independent director representing the interests of other 
shareholders, not an individual who simply works in a family firm (e.g. director, manager or 
employee), not an individual who has a social tie to the controlling family and not an 
individual who holds a senior position in a family firm (e.g. outside CEO). While some of 
these individuals will also have a close relationship to the controlling family, they are not the 
specific interest of this study. In this study, our focus is on non-family members that act as 
representatives of the indirect shareholdings of the controlling family (i.e. are entrusted by 
the controlling family to represent the family’s interests), as they have a strong, documented 
tie to the controlling family 
 The main research questions we pursue in this study are whether family 
representatives are used in a similar way to family members and whether family 
representatives provide net benefits or costs to shareholders. The next two sections detail the 
prior literature and develop our hypotheses related to these research questions.  
 
Family Involvement 
While there is a large body of research examining the effects of family involvement on firm 
performance, relatively little research has been conducted into the determinants of family 
involvement in family firms. Early studies focused on ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
were the first to investigate the determinants of controlling ownership. While not all of their 
results are directly applicable to family firms, they show that the level of controlling 
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ownership varies by industry, is negatively related to firm size and is positively related to the 
wealth gain achievable through more effective monitoring (control potential). Subsequent 
studies have examined the characteristics of ownership in large, listed firms around the world 
and have found that the ownership structures of family firms can be complex, involving 
cross-holdings and pyramid structures (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio 
and Lang, 2002). 
 More recent studies have examined the direct involvement of family members as 
directors, CEOs and managers in family firms and family businesses. Lin and Hu (2007) 
explore the choice of family versus professional CEOs in a sample of Taiwanese firms over 
the period 1991-2000. They find that the presence of a family CEO is positively related to 
family ownership and firm size, and negatively related to R&D intensity. Fiegener (2010) 
examines family involvement in small private businesses in the United States and finds that 
family involvement (family directors, managers and employees) is positively related to 
family ownership and firm size, negatively related to the generation of CEO/management and 
varies across industries. Other studies examine CEO succession in family firms and show that 
the choice of a family successor CEO is positively related to family ownership, family 
presence as managers and firm size, and negatively related to the presence of a large 
blockholder (e.g. Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999).    
Yeh and Woidtke (2005) also examine the determinants of family involvement on the 
board of directors, but they use a more comprehensive measure of family involvement that 
includes all board positions held by the controlling family (family members and family 
representatives). In their sample of Taiwanese firms in 1998 they find that the proportion of 
family-affiliated directors and supervisors on the board is positively related to family 
ownership and excess family control rights (control wedge), Chairman-CEO duality and firm 
age, and is negatively related to board size and past performance.  
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 In our analysis of the determinants of family involvement we progress the literature in 
two ways. First, we question whether family member involvement is representative of all 
family involvement. As detailed above, prior studies have either focused on family members 
or a more comprehensive measure of family involvement that includes all positions 
controlled by the family, without comparison between these two measures. We are 
specifically interested in whether our results differ between these two measures of family 
involvement, which has implications for the generalizability of the results of prior studies that 
have focused solely on family member involvement.  
Second, we examine whether family members and family representatives are used 
differently. This progresses the work of Yeh and Woidtke (2005) by differentiating between 
family members and family representatives, rather than assuming that their use is the same. 
We first investigate whether family members and family representatives are generally used as 
complements or substitutes across various positions in the same firm. In other words, do 
controlling families prefer to use both family members and family representatives together or 
tend to use family members or family representatives in particular firms. We also hypothesise 
that the involvement of family members and family representatives is related to a number of 
firm characteristics. As a summary, our predictions are shown in Table 1.  
Following Fiegener (2010), firm age and the generation of the family firm are 
expected to be positively related to family member involvement as there is more chance for 
the family to expand through birth and marriage. However, the relationship between firm age 
and generation and the use of family representatives is not so clear and depends on whether 
total family involvement increases, stays the same or decreases over time, and whether family 
members replace or complement family representative involvement.  
Hypothesis 1: Family member (representative) involvement is positively 
related (unrelated) to the age and generation of the family firm. 
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As reported by prior studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002), family firms are generally found in business group structures. These family 
business groups include firms originally founded by the family and firms acquired by the 
family as the business group expands. The ownership of these family business groups are 
characterised by pyramid structures and cross-holdings, with families maintaining control of 
their firms through both direct and indirect ownership. Direct ownership is share ownership 
by family members. Indirect ownership is ownership through one of more other entities and 
is characterized by control rights exceeding cashflow rights (i.e. a control wedge). Since there 
are a limited number of family members available to be involved across a family business 
group, we expect firms closer to the family (i.e. founded by the family and with less indirect 
ownership) are likely to have more family member involvement and firms further away from 
the family (i.e. acquired by the family and with greater indirect ownership) are likely to have 
more family representative involvement.  
Hypothesis 2: Family member (representative) involvement is lower (higher) 
in firms with more indirect ownership and in acquired firms. 
It is also likely that the involvement of family members and family representatives is 
related to firm complexity and monitoring needs. To reduce agency costs within the firm, 
controlling families are generally actively involved in monitoring firm operations. A recent 
group of studies (Boone et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008) show that firm 
monitoring mechanisms, such as the board of directors, evolve to meet the specific 
monitoring requirements of individual firms. They find that the size and composition of the 
board of directors is related to specific factors, such as the overall need for monitoring (i.e. 
larger firms have bigger operations and require greater monitoring) and the complexity and 
expected benefits from monitoring (i.e. reduction in agency costs). Based on a theoretical 
model by Raheja (2005), which indicates that the expected benefits of monitoring are lower 
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when monitoring costs are higher, these studies show that boards monitor less in firms with 
high growth opportunities and more research and development, and more in firms with lower 
monitoring costs (e.g. firms with more fixed assets).  
Based on these prior studies, we expect to find more involvement by family members 
and representatives in larger firms, which have greater overall monitoring needs. However, 
the involvement of family members and representatives is also expected to be related to the 
complexity and expected benefits of monitoring. When monitoring is relatively difficult 
(firms with higher market-to-book ratios and more research and development), we expect less 
involvement by family members and representatives, as the expected benefits of monitoring 
are lower. When monitoring is relatively easier (firms with more fixed assets), we expect 
more involvement by family representatives. However, when monitoring is relatively easier 
(firms with more fixed assets) we expect less involvement by family members, as family 
members effectively outsource this monitoring to family representatives so they can 
concentrate on other activities.  
Hypothesis 3: Family member and representative involvement is positively 
related to firm size.  
Hypothesis 4: Family member and representative involvement is negatively 
related to market-to-book and R&D ratios.  
Hypothesis 5: Family member (representative) involvement is negatively 
(positively) related to fixed assets. 
The presence of other large shareholders and independent directors on the board is 
also expected to have an effect on family involvement. First, as they occupy board positions, 
there are potentially less positions available for the family to hold. Second, their presence 
may have a positive governance impact by restricting the overall magnitude of family 
involvement and restricting the use of unqualified family members and excess family 
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representatives. Therefore, we expect the involvement of family members and representatives 
to be negatively related to the presence of other large shareholders and independent directors. 
Hypothesis 6: Family member and representative involvement is negatively 
related to the presence of independent directors and other large shareholders 
on the board.  
In addition, we control for the effects of ownership, board size, Chairman-CEO 
duality and past performance on family involvement as documented by prior studies (Yeh 
and Woidtke, 2005; Fiegener, 2010). We expect a positive relationship between ownership 
and family involvement as higher share ownership indicates greater power to influence the 
appointment of directors and the hiring of managers. Since bigger boards provide a greater 
number of seats available for family members and representatives, we expect a positive 
relationship between board size and family involvement. However, when family involvement 
is measured as a proportion of board size (e.g., family member directors / board size) then the 
relationship is expected to be negative, as the same number of family members and 
representatives results in a lower proportion if board size is larger. For Chairman-CEO 
duality, past performance and industry differences, we have no prior expectations.  
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
Family Involvement and Firm Performance 
To determine whether the various choices of family involvement provide benefits or costs to 
shareholders, prior studies have related measures of family involvement to firm performance. 
Early studies focused on relationships between family ownership and firm performance. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) find a non-linear relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance in their sample of S&P500 firms in the US, indicating an initial positive 
relationship between family ownership and firm performance that becomes negative at higher 
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levels of ownership. Claessens et al. (2002) and Maury (2006) examine the individual 
relationships between ownership rights and excess control rights and firm performance in 
large, listed Asian and European family firms and find a positive relationship between 
ownership rights and firm performance, and a negative relationship between excess control 
rights and firm performance. The results of these studies indicate that family ownership helps 
to align the interests of the family with other shareholders, but only up to a certain point. 
Beyond this point, further ownership or excess control rights help to entrench the position of 
the family, which is associated with deteriorating firm performance. 
However, studies of unlisted family businesses have not found similar significant 
relationships between family ownership and firm performance. Westhead and Howorth 
(2006), Castillo and Wakefield (2006) and Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) examine 
relationships between family ownership and firm performance using samples of small, 
unlisted family businesses from the UK, US and Italy, respectively. They find no significant 
linear or non-linear relationships between family ownership and firm performance. These 
results suggest that relationships between ownership variables and firm performance are 
strongest in large, listed family firms and that other measures of family involvement may be 
more useful in smaller family businesses. 
With respect to family member involvement on the board of directors, Anderson and 
Reeb (2004) find that a balance of family members and independent directors is optimal in 
S&P500 firms in the US. They state that some family influence on the board provides 
benefits to minority shareholders but too much influence creates potential for moral hazard 
conflicts between the family and outside shareholders. The only study to specifically examine 
the effect of a family member chairman is Villalonga and Amit (2006), who find a positive 
performance effect when a family firm board is headed by a family member chairman. In 
14 
 
additional testing, they also find that performance is higher when a founder family chairman 
is coupled with an outside CEO and lower when the chairman is a family descendent.  
The effect of having a family member CEO has been investigated in studies of both 
listed family firms and unlisted family businesses. Anderson and Reeb (2003), Maury (2006) 
and Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine the relationship between family member CEOs and 
firm performance in listed family firms in the US and Europe and find a positive performance 
effect if the CEO position is held by a family member, particularly for first generation or 
founder CEOs. A similar positive effect on performance is found for family member CEOs in 
unlisted family businesses by Minichelli et al. (2010). However, Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
also find a negative performance effect for descendent family CEOs, which suggests that the 
benefits of family member CEOs may be limited to family founders.  
 Family involvement in the top management team (including the CEO and other top 
executives) has only been investigated in unlisted family businesses. This is because studies 
of unlisted family businesses have accessed this information by surveying management and 
asking for the number of family members in management. In listed family firms, 
identification of family members in management is difficult as family relationships are not 
required to be disclosed in most markets. The results of studies of unlisted family businesses 
are somewhat mixed, with Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) predicting an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between the proportion of family managers and firm performance, but finding a 
negative quadratic relationship. Based on the faultline approach in group dynamics, which 
predicts that two sub-groups of roughly equal size (e.g. family and non-family managers) 
results in disruptions and poorer performance, but having a dominant sub-group does not, 
Minichilli et al. (2010) predict and find a U-shaped non-linear relationship between the 
proportion of family members in top management positions and firm performance. However, 
both studies are consistent in their conclusion that once professional executives hold top 
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management positions in family businesses, having family members involved in top 
management positions (excluding the CEO position) is detrimental to firm performance.  
 Yeh and Woidtke (2005) is the only study to relate a more comprehensive measure of 
family involvement to firm performance. They find that a higher proportion of family-
affiliated board members (family members and family representatives) is associated with 
weaker firm performance in family firms in Taiwan. However, they do not distinguish 
between family members and family representatives, they do not investigate family member 
or representative involvement in the chairman and CEO positions and they do not control for 
further family involvement in non-CEO management positions.  
In this study we progress the literature on family involvement and firm performance 
by differentiating between family members and family representatives. We do this across the 
positions of directors, chairmen and CEOs. Our main objective for doing this is to determine 
whether family representatives are associated with net benefits or costs to shareholders. We 
are also the first to relate all four main mechanisms of family involvement from the finance 
and management literatures – ownership, directors, CEOs and managers – to firm 
performance in the same setting. Prior studies on both listed firms and unlisted businesses 
have examined only two or three of these measures (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Sciascia and 
Mazzola, 2008; Minichilli et al., 2010). By using all four mechanisms of family involvement, 
we reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias and can isolate the influence of each 
measure of family involvement on firm performance.  
 We use agency and stewardship theories to examine whether family representatives 
are associated with net benefits or costs to shareholders. From an agency cost perspective, we 
expect family representatives to be an agency concern to minority shareholders, but to a 
lesser extent than family members. This is because the interests of family representatives are 
expected to be somewhat aligned with the interests of the controlling family – more closely 
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than the interests of outsiders, but to a lesser extent than family members. Prior studies show 
that the main cost of family involvement is the increased incentive and opportunity of the 
family group to expropriate wealth from other shareholders. This can occur through excessive 
compensation, related-party transactions, special dividends, risk avoidance and remaining 
active in management even when they are no longer competent to run the company 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003).  
Since family representatives effectively assist controlling families to extend their 
control within the firm, we expect that family representatives, to at least some extent, will 
assist the controlling family in consuming private benefits of control. This creates agency 
costs for shareholders, albeit not of the same magnitude as family members. We also expect 
family representatives to be associated with lower agency costs than family members, since 
the appointment of a family representative as a director or manager is likely to result in a 
more qualified professional, rather than a potentially unqualified family member, in the 
particular position. 
From a stewardship perspective, family representatives may also provide benefits to 
shareholders, but again to a lesser extent than family members. The documented benefits of 
family member involvement include the long-term view of wealth creation by the family 
group compared to the relatively short-term view of hired CEOs (James, 1999), the family’s 
superior knowledge and ability to monitor the operations of the company (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985), the presence of the family’s reputation capital that can result in a lower cost of debt 
(Anderson et al., 2003) and the ability of the family group to create more wealth through 
political connections than other owners (Faccio and Parsley, 2009).  
Family representatives may also provide some similar benefits to shareholders, as 
family representatives are likely to have a longer term view than outsiders, as they may 
expect a life-long career in the family’s firms. However, their longer term view is not 
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expected to be as long as the inter-generational view of the controlling family. Family 
representatives may also invest their own reputation capital in the family firm, due to their 
close tie to the controlling family. However, again this is not expected to be as valuable as the 
reputation capital of family members. Ultimately, whether family representatives provide net 
benefits or costs to shareholders, and how this relates to the net benefits or costs of family 
members, is an empirical question, which we investigate in our subsequent analysis. Hence, 
we present our hypotheses in the null form. 
Hypothesis 7: Firm performance is unrelated to family member involvement. 
Hypothesis 8: Firm performance is unrelated to family representative 
involvement. 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
Sample 
Our sample comprises 536 family firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange that could be 
identified as family-controlled, provided annual reports to the exchange for the year 2007 and 
have financial and ownership data available from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) 
database.2 We specifically use a sample of listed firms from Taiwan as they are subject to 
disclosure regulations that require them to report family relationships between directors and 
top executives and details of whether directors are representing their own interests or the 
interests of other entities in annual reports.3 To our knowledge, this is the only market that 
requires such disclosures, which allow us to clearly identify family member directors, family 
representative directors, family member chairmen, family representative chairmen, family 
member CEOs, family representative CEOs and family managers.  
 Similar to other emerging markets, firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are 
characterised by large controlling shareholders, usually family groups, who are actively 
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involved on the board of directors and in management. Taiwan has a German civil law origin 
and a strong traditional Chinese culture with an emphasis on family values. Corporate boards 
in Taiwan are comprised of directors and supervisors. Directors and supervisors are both 
elected by shareholders at annual meetings and generally all serve the same 3-year terms. 
Supervisors, however, do not have formal voting rights in board decisions. Their purpose is 
to independently monitor the activities of the board, but in effect they are generally 
representatives of the firm’s major shareholders. In our analysis, we include both directors 
and supervisors as they are both involved in the monitoring and advising functions of the 
board.  
Board independence in Taiwan is generally low as there are no regulations or listing 
rules that require all companies to appoint independent directors. Since 2002, new listings 
have been required to appoint independent directors “no less than two in number and not less 
than one-fifth of the total number of directors”.4 These rules have since been expanded to also 
cover financial firms and firms with paid-up capital in excess of NT$50 billion. However, in 
2010 the Taiwan Stock Exchange reported that only 288 of 741 listed companies had 
independent directors.5 Despite cumulative voting being the norm (mandatory since 2011)6 in 
director elections in Taiwan, minority shareholders have little influence over board 
composition, which is dominated by controlling shareholders and, to a lesser extent, other 
large blockholders.  
In our analysis, family-controlled firms are identified as those where a family group 
holds more board seats (including seats held directly and through representatives) than any 
other individual or group on the board, or if the family group that founded the firm holds the 
same number of board seats as the next largest group.7 Our sample excludes individual-
controlled, government-controlled, company-controlled and widely-held firms. We manually 
check annual reports for all firms to identify who occupies each of the board seats, their 
19 
 
family relationships and the entities they represent. We also find the original founders of our 
sample firms through analysing annual reports, company websites and internet searches.  
 
Variables 
Our analysis includes the following variables. All family involvement includes the number of 
family members and family representatives. Family members are the number of family 
members (through blood or marriage) holding director or management positions. Family 
representatives are the number of non-family member representatives of the family’s listed 
and unlisted entities holding director or CEO positions. Family directors include both family 
member and family representative directors. Family member directors are family members 
holding director or supervisor positions on the board. Family representative directors are 
family representatives holding director or supervisor positions on the board. Family chairman 
and family CEO are dummy variables equal to one when a family member or representative 
holds these positions. These variables are also split into family member chairman, family 
representative chairman, family member CEO and family representative CEO. Family 
management is a dummy variable equal to one when a family member holds a non-CEO 
position in top management.8 It is not possible to identify family representatives in non-CEO 
management positions as representative relationships are not disclosed for executives.  
Ownership is the cashflow rights ownership of the controlling owner. Control wedge 
is the ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling owner. A higher control wedge 
indicates higher indirect ownership through pyramid structures and cross-holdings. Following 
Claessens et al. (2000), ownership variables are calculated by tracing the ultimate ownership 
of companies through direct and indirect shareholdings. Cashflow rights are calculated as 
direct ownership plus the product of indirect ownership stakes back to the ultimate owner. 
Control rights are calculated as direct ownership plus the weakest link in the chain of indirect 
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ownership back to the ultimate owner. Total assets is our measure of firm size and is in 
billions of NT dollars. Age is the number of years since the firm was founded. Debt is total 
liabilities divided by total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense to sales. Market-to-book 
is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Fixed assets is the ratio of 
fixed assets (e.g., property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Growth is the annual 
percentage change in total assets. Return on assets is earnings before interest and tax divided 
by total assets. Prior 2-year average return on assets is the average return on assets for the 
past two years.9  
Board size is the number of directors and supervisors. Board independence is the 
number of independent directors and supervisors divided by board size.10 Chairman-CEO 
duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the same person holds both positions. Second 
largest shareholder is a dummy variable equal to one when the second largest shareholder 
(unrelated to the family) holds one or more positions on the board.11 1st generation family 
firm is a dummy variable equal to one if the founder is still involved as a director or manager. 
2nd generation family firm is a dummy variable if the founder is no longer involved. Acquired 
family firm is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was acquired and not founded by the 
family. Industry sector dummy variables are one for firms allocated to the following industry 
sectors based on Taiwan Stock Exchange industry classifications – Industrials (3-
7,12,22,23,27), Electronics (13-20), Materials (1,8-11,21), Consumer (2,24,26) and 
Financials (25).  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Full descriptive statistics are only 
reported for continuous variables. The average number of family members involved in family 
firms is 2.70, relative to an average number of family representatives of 2.32 and average all 
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family involvement of 5.02. This indicates that total family involvement is understated, by 
2.32/5.02=46%, if family members only are used as the measure of family involvement. All 
family involvement ranges from 1 to 21 family members and representatives.12 The average 
board is comprised of 51.54 percent of family directors, with family members comprising 
28.23 percent and family representatives comprising 23.31 percent of the board. There is a 
family chairman in 92 percent (81 percent family member chairman and 11 percent family 
representative chairman) and a family CEO in 53 percent (47 percent family member CEO 
and 6 percent family representative CEO) of firms. Family members are involved in non-
CEO top management positions in 53 percent of firms.  
The average family holds ownership rights of 24.79 percent and has a control wedge 
of 1.36. The average firm has NT$30.27 billion (approximately US$1 billion) in total assets 
and an age of 28.93 years. Average debt, R&D and fixed asset ratios are .47, .31 and .11 
respectively. The average market-to-book ratio is 4.37, growth is 7.04 percent, return on 
assets is 9.19 percent and prior 2-year ROA is 6.59 percent. The average board comprises 
9.88 directors and supervisors and has board independence of 9.27 percent. Chairman-CEO 
duality occurs in 32 percent of firms and the second largest shareholder is present on the 
board in 23 percent of firms. The sample is made up of 54 percent of first generation family 
firms, 30 percent of second generation family firms and 16 percent of acquired family firms. 
The industry composition is 40 percent in Industrials, 41 percent in Electronics, 9 percent in 
Materials, 6 percent in Consumer and 4 percent in Financials.  
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
Table 3 displays correlations between family involvement variables in Panel A and 
ownership and financial variables in Panel B. In unreported results, the correlation between 
the number of family members and the number of family representatives is -.28 (p<.01). The 
reported results in Panel A also document significant negative correlations between the 
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family member and family representative variables. For example, the correlation between the 
proportions of family member directors and family representative directors is -.41 (p<.01). In 
addition, the correlations between the different family member variables are positive (family 
member directors, family member chairman, family member CEO and family management) 
and the correlations between the different family representative variables are positive (family 
representative directors, family representative chairman and family representative CEO). 
These correlations provide some initial evidence that family members and family 
representatives are generally not used together across different positions in the same firm. 
Also worth noting is that some of the correlations between family involvement variables to be 
used in the same models are high (e.g., family member CEO and family management have a 
correlation of .83). This requires us to run multiple specifications to avoid multicollinearity 
concerns in our subsequent analysis.  
In Panel B, correlations between the ownership and financial variables do not raise 
any multicollinearity issues. The highest correlation is -.70 between dummy variables 
indicating first and second generation family firms. However, these two variables are not 
used together in the same model in our analysis. The highest correlation between variables 
used in the same model is .58 between Ln(Total Assets) and Debt. Correlations between 
industry sector variables are not presented but are highest at -.67 between dummy variables 
indicating the industrials and electronics sectors. However, these two variables are not used 
together in the same model in our analysis. In unreported correlations between the family 
involvement and ownership and financial variables, the highest correlation is -.39 between 
the first generation family firm dummy variable and family representative directors / board 
size.  
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Family Member and Representative Involvement 
In this section we examine the determinants of all family involvement, family member 
involvement and family representative involvement. Our particular interest is in whether 
family member involvement is representative of all family involvement and whether 
controlling families use family members and family representatives differently. In our 
analysis we use three types of models due to the different characteristics of the dependent 
variables. For dependent variables that follow the form of whole numbers only (e.g. 1, 2, 3), 
such as the number of family members and representatives involved in family firms, we use 
Poisson count models. For continuous dependent variables that have a lower bound of 0 and 
an upper bound of 1, such as family member directors / board size, we use Tobit models. For 
binary dependent variables, such as the family member CEO dummy variable, we used Probit 
models. All models include robust standard errors. Hypothesized relationships are displayed 
in Table 1.  
 Table 4 presents the models of the determinants of all family involvement, family 
member involvement and family representative involvement. Since most prior studies focus 
solely on family member involvement and do not identify all family involvement (e.g. 
Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Fiegener, 2010), we first compare the 
results of specifications one and two in Table 4. We find that a number of results differ 
between the two specifications. Overall family involvement is significantly higher in second 
generation family firms (.13, p<.01), firms with a higher control wedge (.12, p<.01), larger 
firms (.04, p<.01), firms with more fixed assets (.20, p<.10) and firms in the financial sector 
(.18, p<.05). However, none of these results are significant if family member involvement is 
used as the sole measure of family involvement. We also find that family members are less 
likely to be involved in acquired family firms (-.38, p<.01) but this result is insignificant for 
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all family involvement. These results show that different measures of family involvement 
produce different results.  
 In the second and third specifications in Table 4, we compare family member 
involvement and family representative involvement. In the two models, we find negative 
relationships between the number of family members and the number of family 
representatives involved in family firms (-.12, p<.01; -.25, p<.01). This indicates that 
controlling families generally choose to use family members or family representatives in their 
firms, rather than using family members and family representatives together. 
With respect to firm age and generation, we find that more family members are 
involved in older firms (.32, p<.01) and more family representatives are involved in second 
generation family firms (.42, p<.01). This confirms that more family members are available 
for use and are being utilized as family firms age (Fiegener, 2010). The results for second 
generation family firms indicate that family representatives are not more or less likely to be 
utilized as the firm ages, but are utilized when founders are no longer involved. This suggests 
that when a firm founder is no longer involved in the firm, families tend to further extend 
their control by using family representatives, perhaps to offset the loss of leadership from the 
retirement of the founder.  
Relating the use of family members and representatives to the closeness of the firm to 
the family, we find that firms with more indirect ownership have greater involvement by 
family representatives (.28, p<.01). In addition, we find that acquired firms have greater 
involvement by family representatives (.43, p<.01) and less involvement by family members 
(-.38, p<.01). These results are consistent with our expectations that family members focus 
their attention on firms closer to the family (i.e. founded by the family) and use family 
representatives in firms further from the family (i.e. acquired by the family and with greater 
indirect ownership) within family business groups.  
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 With respect to firm complexity and monitoring needs, we find that more family 
representatives are involved in larger firms (.10, p<.01) and firms with more fixed assets (.53, 
p<.01). Fewer family members and family representatives are involved in firms with higher 
market-to-book ratios (-.03, p<.01; -.04, p<.01). These results are consistent with our 
expectations that family member and family representative involvement is related to 
monitoring complexity, particularly as family representatives are more likely to be used in 
firms where more monitoring is required (larger firms) and where monitoring is relatively 
easier (firms with more fixed assets).  
We also find that the presence of independent board members and the second largest 
shareholder have negative relationships with the involvement of both family members and 
representatives (-.26, p<.10; -.09, p<.10; -1.52, p<.01; -.20, p<.05). Control variables indicate 
that both family member and family representative involvement are positively related to 
ownership and board size, and are higher in the materials and consumer industry sectors. A 
negative relationship is found between the involvement of family representatives and prior 2-
year average ROA, which suggests that family representatives help entrench the family in 
poor performing firms.  
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
 In Table 5 we separate family member and family representative involvement into 
specific positions - directors, chairmen, CEOs and managers.13 Of particular interest is that 
family member involvement as directors, chairmen, CEOs and managers are generally all 
positively related to each other. 14  Also, family representative involvement as directors, 
chairmen and CEOs are also positively related to each other. This implies that families 
generally extend their control across both the board of directors and management. However, 
family member and family representative involvement across these positions are generally 
negatively related to each other, confirming our previous result that controlling families 
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generally prefer to use family members or family representatives in their firms, rather than 
using family members and family representatives together.15  
 The remaining results in Table 5 are also consistent with our prior analysis. We find 
that a greater proportion of family member directors are involved in older firms (.07, p<.01) 
and a greater proportion of family representative directors are involved in second generation 
family firms (.15, p<.01). Family representative directors and family representative chairmen 
are more likely in firms with a higher control wedge (.10, p<.01; .37, p<.05). Family 
representative directors and family representative CEOs are more likely in acquired family 
firms (.16, p<.01; .69, p<.05), whereas family member directors and family managers are less 
likely (-.08, p<.01; -.81, p<.01). Bigger firms have a higher proportion of family 
representative directors (.04, p<.01) but are less likely to have a family member CEO (-.22, 
p<.01). Firms where monitoring is more difficult (higher market-to-book or R&D) have a 
lower proportion of family member directors (-.01, p<.10), are less likely to have a family 
member chairman (-.33, p<.05) and are more likely to have a family representative chairman 
(.53, p<.01). Firms with more fixed assets have a higher proportion of family representative 
directors (.25, p<.01) and are less likely to have family involved in management (-1.42, 
p<.05). 
In addition, higher board independence is associated with a lower proportion of 
family representative directors (-.47, p<.01) and a greater likelihood of a family 
representative CEO (2.99, p<.01). The presence of the second largest shareholder on the 
board is associated with a lower proportion of family representative directors (-.07, p<.05) 
and a greater likelihood of a family representative chairman (.46, p<.10). Within the control 
variables, family ownership is positively related to the proportion of family member and 
representative directors, but has no relationship with other measures of family involvement. 
Chairman-CEO duality is associated with fewer family representative directors and a family 
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member CEO. Finally, better past performance increases the likelihood of a family member 
CEO and family representative CEO. 
--- Insert Table 5 about here --- 
In summary, these results show that family member and family representative 
involvement is different. Controlling families tend to use family members or family 
representatives across firm positions. In particular, controlling families choose to use more 
family members in older firms and in firms closer to the family (i.e. founded by the family) 
within the family business group. Alternatively, family representatives are more likely to be 
used in firms further away from the family (i.e. acquired by the family and with greater 
indirect ownership) within the family business group and in firms where more monitoring is 
required but is not overly difficult (larger firms with more fixed assets).  
 
Family Involvement and Firm Performance 
In this section, we relate our measures of family member and representative involvement to 
firm performance. We use return on assets (ROA) as our primary measure of performance as 
it is the most common measure across the management and finance literatures. We also report 
results for 3-year average ROA (ROA 3-yr), 1-year stock returns (Stock return), 3-year 
average stock returns (Returns 3-yr) and the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-book) for 
completeness.16 Consistent with prior studies, all models include controls for firm size, firm 
age, debt, fixed assets, R&D, growth, board size, Chairman-CEO duality, second largest 
shareholder and industry dummy variables (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Yeh and Woidtke, 
2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In our analysis we simultaneously relate all of our 
measures of family involvement (directors, CEOs, managers and ownership) to firm 
performance. This is important as failure to control for one or more of these measures can 
28 
 
result in omitted variable bias.17 It also allows us to isolate the influence of each measure of 
family involvement on firm performance.  
 Table 6 presents these results. In the first two specifications we compare the results 
between using all family involvement and family member involvement. We find a negative 
relationship between all family involvement and firm performance (-.40, p<.10) in 
specification one, but an insignificant relationship between family member involvement and 
firm performance in specification two. This again shows that different measures of family 
involvement produce different results. In particular, it indicates that conducting analysis only 
using family members is subject to omitted variable bias, as the results in specification two 
are inconsistent with both specifications one and three. 
In the third specification we include both family member involvement and family 
representative involvement, and find a negative coefficient on family members (-.62, p<.10) 
and an insignificant coefficient on family representatives (-.35, p=.15). These results suggest 
that family members are associated with significant costs to shareholders, but this is not the 
case for family representatives. Comparing the magnitudes of the two coefficients, we find 
that the coefficient on family representatives is 57 percent of the size of the coefficient on 
family members. For the average firm in our sample, this means the presence of one 
additional family member is associated with a drop in return on assets of 0.62 percentage 
points (6.7 percent lower), compared to 0.35 percentage points (3.8 precent lower) for one 
additional family representative. 
 In the fourth specification we separate family member and family representative 
involvement into specific positions - directors, chairmen, CEOs and managers. We find a 
negative relationship between the proportion of family member directors on the board (-7.39, 
p<.10) and firm performance. Other coefficients on family involvement measures, including 
the coefficient on the proportion of family representative directors on the board (-4.20, p=.16), 
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are insignificant. These results highlight that it is family member involvement as directors 
that has a negative relationship with firm performance.  
 In specifications five to eight we repeat this analysis using different measures of firm 
performance – 3-year average ROA, 1-year stock returns, 3-year average stock returns and 
the market-to-book ratio. In all specifications we find a negative coefficient on the proportion 
of family member directors. In specifications five and eight we also find a negative 
coefficient on the proportion of family representative directors. However, in each 
specification (4-8) the magnitude of the coefficient for family representative directors is 
smaller than the coefficient for family member directors. Therefore, these results indicate that 
there is evidence that family representatives, particularly family representative directors, are 
associated with net costs to shareholders, but to a lesser extent than family members.  
 We also find some significant results in individual specifications. Family 
representative chairmen have a negative relationship with 1-year stock returns (-15.95, p<.05) 
and family representative CEOs have a positive relationship with 3-year return on assets 
(5.73, p<.10). These results suggest that the benefits and costs of family representatives 
differs between positions, with family representative CEOs being beneficial to shareholders, 
while family representative chairmen are not. Across the specifications, the results of the 
control variables are generally consistent with prior studies (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2004; 
Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
--- Insert Table 6 about here --- 
 
Further Analysis  
Prior studies have documented differential effects between family members of different 
generations (e.g., founder and family descendent CEOs) and firm performance (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). To examine this in our analysis, we split family member directors by their 
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generation relative to the original founder, and family member chairmen and family member 
CEOs into founder and non-founder categories. This analysis is presented in Panels A and B 
of Table 7. In Table 7, we use specifications 4-8 from Table 6, but only the coefficients of 
our variables of interest are presented.  
 Across the five specifications in Panel A, we find that the coefficients on 1st 
generation family member directors are all insignificant, while the coefficients on 2nd 
generation family member directors are all negative. The coefficients on 3rd generation family 
member directors are also negative in four out of five specifications. The coefficients on 
family representative directors are consistent with our previous analysis (significant in two 
specifications). These results are consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006) and show that it 
is descendent family members (rather than founding family members) that have a negative 
relationship with firm performance. We also note that in all specifications, the magnitude of 
the coefficients on family representative directors are smaller than the coefficients on 2nd and 
3rd generation family member directors, which indicates that family representative directors 
are preferable to descendent family member directors.18  
 In Panel B, we measure the effect of family founder, family non-founder and family 
representative CEOs and chairmen, relative to all other types of CEOs and chairmen. In this 
panel, each cell represents a different specification. For example, the results for family 
founder chairman are results of a dummy variable identifying the effect of a family founder 
chairman relative to all other types of chairmen. This is different to our prior analysis, as here 
we use only one CEO or chairman dummy variable at a time (indicating the effect relative to 
all other types of CEOs or chairmen), whereas in our prior analysis we used two dummy 
variables in the same specification (indicating the effect of family member and family 
representative CEOs and chairmen relative to outside CEOs or chairmen only).  
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Consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006) we find that a family founder chairman 
has a positive relationship with firm performance (in 3 specifications) and a family founder 
CEO has a positive relationship with firm performance (in 1 specification). We also find that 
a family non-founder chairman and a family representative chairman have a negative 
relationship with firm performance in one specification each. In addition, we find that family 
representative CEOs have a positive relationship with 3-year average ROA. This analysis 
confirms that our results are in line with those of prior research on family founders and 
family descendents.  
 In Panel C, we also conduct analysis on expected versus excess family directors. 
Villalonga and Amit (2009) extend the concept of excess family control to excess board 
representation. This is defined as the proportion of positions on the board of directors 
controlled by the family above their proportion of family ownership. In essence, it means 
families are controlling more board seats than a fair allocation by proportional ownership 
would allow. We utilize this concept to examine whether the negative relationships between 
family member directors, family representative directors and firm performance are due to 
expected or excess board representation.19 
 We assume that family members are allocated board seats first, followed by family 
representatives. 20  This allows us to create the following four variables. Expected family 
member directors is the proportion of family member directors up to or equal to the 
proportion of family ownership. Expected family representative directors is the proportion of 
family representative directors (after including family member directors) up to or equal to the 
proportion of family ownership. Excess family member directors is the proportion of family 
member directors above the proportion of family ownership. Excess family representative 
directors is the proportion of family representative directors (after including family member 
directors) above the proportion of family ownership. 
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 We find that the negative relationships between family member directors, family 
representative directors and firm performance are concentrated in the excess director 
variables. The coefficient on excess family member directors is negative in four out of five 
specifications. The coefficient on excess family representative directors is negative in the 
same two specifications as Table 6. We also find a negative coefficient on expected family 
member directors in one specification. Overall, these results show that the negative 
relationships between family member involvement, family representative involvement and 
firm performance are primarily due to excess family representation on the board of directors. 
This confirms that these family members and representatives are holding these excess board 
positions to entrench the control of the family, which is not in the interests of shareholders. 
--- Insert Table 7 about here --- 
 
Robustness Checks  
A number of robustness checks have been undertaken to confirm the validity of our results. 
We use alternative definitions of family firms, where the control rights of the family group 
must exceed 10 percent and 25 percent. This reduces our sample size to 451 and 283 family 
firms, respectively. The results for these two sub-samples are consistent with those reported, 
which indicates that our results are not sensitive to the definition of a family firm.  
 We address endogeneity concerns in the following ways. First, we use the models in 
Tables 4 and 5 (first stage) and Table 6 (second stage) to undertake two-stage least squares 
analysis. This effectively uses the second generation family firm and acquired family firm 
dummy variables as instrumental variables for family involvement. We believe these 
variables are valid instruments as they are generally significantly related to family 
involvement variables (see Tables 4 and 5) and are generally unrelated to our firm 
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performance variables. 21 Using this two-stage least squares approach, we find results 
consistent with those reported in Table 6.  
Second, since specifications 2 and 3 in Table 4 and specifications 1 to 7 in Table 5 
may suffer from simultaneity bias, we re-estimate these specifications using a two-stage 
approach. Normally, this could be done quite easily if the different specifications had 
different independent variables. However, in our analysis all specifications contain the same 
(non-family involvement) independent variables. Our only alternative is to re-specify each of 
these models in a more parsimonious manner, by excluding independent variables that are not 
significantly related to each family involvement variable. For example, in specification 2 in 
Table 4 the variables R&D, Fixed Assets, Chair-CEO duality, Prior 2-yr average ROA, 
Industry (Electronics) and Industry (Financials) are excluded. In specification 3 in Table 4 the 
variables Ln(Age), R&D, Chair-CEO duality, Industry (Electronics) and Industry (Financials) 
are excluded. This creates variation across the specifications and allows us to use a two-stage 
approach. Results using this approach are consistent with those reported.  
 In addition, to examine whether firm performance is driving family member and 
representative involvement, we split our sample into quartiles based on performance in 2007 
and track changes to our family director variables in 2008. In the quartile with the worst 
performance in 2007 we find 17/134 firms increased their proportion of family directors and 
35/134 firms decreased their proportion of family directors. In the quartile with the best 
performance in 2007 we find 21/134 firms increased their proportion of family directors and 
32/134 firms decreased their proportion of family directors. This analysis shows that family 
firms with the worst (best) performance in 2007 were not more likely to increase (decrease) 
their proportion of family directors in 2008. Therefore, we are confident that our results 
document an effect running from family directors to firm performance.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Prior research on family involvement in family firms has generally focused on the 
involvement of family members. In this study we highlight the role played by family 
representatives (non-family members who act as representatives of the controlling family’s 
indirect shareholdings in the firm). We focus on family representatives as they are 
identifiable individuals used by controlling families to extend their influence within the firm.  
 Our results have a number of implications. We find that solely focusing on family 
member involvement understates (by 46%) the influence of controlling families in our sample 
of listed family firms. Also, we find that controlling families use family members and family 
representatives differently and that family members and family representatives provide 
shareholders with different net benefits and costs. For policymakers, this indicates that 
disclosure of family member and representative relationships within firms is important and 
value-relevant to investors. This is particularly important in countries with large numbers of 
family firms and where controlling families maintain control of their firms through indirect 
ownership (which is the basis for the use of family representatives). For academics, our 
results suggest that future studies should specifically identify both family member and family 
representative involvement in family firms.  
 In addition, we find that family representatives (particularly family representative 
directors) are associated with net costs to shareholders. This indicates that family 
representatives are an agency concern to shareholders, albeit a smaller concern than family 
members (particularly descendent family members). However, we find that these net costs to 
shareholders are predominantly found when family members and representatives hold excess 
board positions (greater than the controlling family’s ownership interest). Therefore, one 
potential solution for policymakers (in Taiwan) is to limit the number of board seats 
controlling families can hold to their ownership position. Whether the same corporate 
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governance policy is appropriate for other markets can be determined by similar analysis, 
after disclosure of family member and representative relationships in firms is forthcoming.  
 We would also like to acknowledge the limitations of our analysis. First, we focus on 
a specific group of individuals with a specific documented tie to the controlling family, which 
we term family representatives. There will be other individuals within family firms that also 
have connections to the controlling family, such as social connections or other currently 
undocumented connections, whom may also have similar characteristics as family 
representatives, i.e. their interests are partially aligned with the controlling family. Future 
studies should continue to identify and investigate these groups.  
 Second, we look at the existence of family members and representatives in different 
positions in the firm and their relationship with firm performance. In reality, existence is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to have an effect on firm operations. In effect, this 
study assumes that the average effect is the same across all firms, but recent studies show that 
this is unlikely to be the case, with the effect likely to be moderated by other factors 
(Chrisman et al., 2012). In addition, we specifically examine the effect of family involvement 
on firm performance. However, other research shows that non-economic goals are also 
important to the family (e.g. Sharma, 2004). Future studies should further examine these 
issues.  
 Third, the empirical analysis we undertake in this paper is predominantly based on a 
cross-section of firms in one year. We attempt to overcome this weakness by using multi-year 
measures of firm performance (3-year average ROA and 3-year average stock returns) and by 
conducting robustness checks to address endogeneity issues. Future studies should strive to 
conduct similar analysis using a panel of observations to examine the time-series dimensions 
of these relationships. Panel analysis would also allow the use of fixed firm effects to reduce 
the potential influence of omitted variable bias.  
36 
 
 Finally, our analysis is conducted on listed family firms. Whether our results are 
generalizable to unlisted family businesses is an interesting issue that is worthy of further 
study. We expect family representatives to be most prolific in listed family firms where 
controlling families have significant indirect ownership stakes in their firms. In unlisted 
family businesses, if controlling families are more likely to hold direct ownership stakes in 
their firms, then the prevalence of family representatives is expected to be limited. This 
suggests that family member involvement should be more representative of the influence of 
controlling families in unlisted family businesses than in listed family firms.  
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TABLE 1 
Predicted Relationships for Family Member and Representative Involvement 
 
 
All 
Family 
Involvement 
Family 
Member 
 Involvement 
Family  
Representative 
Involvement 
Family involvement interactions:    
Other family member involvement  ? ? 
Other family representative involvement  ? ? 
Firm age and generation:    
Firm Age ? + ? 
2nd Generation Family Firm ? + ? 
Closeness to family:    
Indirect Ownership (Control Wedge) ? - + 
Acquired Family Firm ? - + 
Complexity and monitoring:    
Firm Size + + + 
Market-to-book - - - 
R&D - - - 
Fixed Assets ? - + 
Presence of others:    
Board Independence - - - 
2nd Largest Shareholder - - - 
Controls:     
Ownership + + + 
Board Size* +/- +/- +/- 
Chairman-CEO Duality ? ? ? 
Prior 2-year ROA ? ? ? 
Industry dummies ? ? ? 
 
Notes: * Relationships between family involvement variables and board size depend on whether the dependent variable is a number (+) or a 
proportion of board size (-). 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Median Min Max Stdev 
All Family Involvement 5.02 4.00 1.00 21.00 2.79 
   Family Members 2.70 2.00 0.00 16.00 1.85 
   Family Representatives 2.32 1.00 0.00 16.00 2.66 
Family Directors / Board Size (%) 51.54 45.45 9.09 100.00 24.30 
   Family Member Directors / Board Size (%) 28.23 25.00 0.00 100.00 18.49 
   Family Representative Directors / Board Size (%) 23.31 14.29 0.00 100.00 25.59 
Family Chairman 0.92     
   Family Member Chairman 0.81     
   Family Representative Chairman 0.11     
Family CEO 0.53     
   Family Member CEO 0.47     
   Family Representative CEO 0.06     
Family Management 0.53     
Ownership (%) 24.79 21.54 0.66 81.43 17.06 
Control Wedge 1.36 1.06 1.00 3.00 0.60 
Total Assets (NT$ billions) 30.27 6.56 0.01 1702.66 105.41 
Age (years) 28.93 29.00 2.00 62.00 13.08 
Debt 0.47 0.40 0.04 1.00 0.30 
R&D 0.31 0.20 0.00 2.00 0.49 
Fixed Assets 0.11 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.18 
Market-to-book 4.37 4.42 0.37 10.00 2.75 
Growth (%) 7.04 2.98 -100.00 200.00 43.13 
Return on Assets (%) 9.19 10.05 -113.57 58.48 15.76 
Prior 2-year ROA (%) 6.59 8.41 -106.04 72.71 19.49 
Board Size 9.88 9.00 6.00 25.00 2.92 
Board Independence (%) 9.27 0.00 0.00 55.56 13.86 
Chairman-CEO duality 0.32     
2nd Largest Shareholder 0.23     
1st Generation Family Firm 0.54     
2nd Generation Family Firm 0.30     
Acquired Family Firm 0.16     
Industry – Industrials 0.40     
Industry – Electronics 0.41     
Industry – Materials 0.09     
Industry – Consumer 0.06     
Industry – Financials  0.04     
 
Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics of the sample firms. The sample includes 536 family-controlled firms listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange in 2007. All family involvement includes the number of family members and family representatives. Family members are 
the number of family members (through blood or marriage) holding director or management positions. Family representatives are the 
number of non-family member representatives of the family’s listed and unlisted entities holding director or CEO positions. Family directors 
include both family member and family representative directors. Family member directors are family members holding director or 
supervisor positions on the board. Family representative directors are family representatives holding director or supervisor positions on the 
board. Family Chairman and CEO are dummy variables equal to one when a family member or representative holds these positions. These 
variables are also split into family member chairman, family representative chairman, family member CEO and family representative CEO. 
Family management is a dummy variable equal to one when a family member holds a non-CEO position in top management. Ownership is 
the cashflow rights ownership of the controlling owner. Control wedge is the ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling owner. 
Total assets is measured in billions of NT dollars. Age is the number of years since the firm was founded. Debt is total liabilities divided by 
total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense to sales. Fixed assets is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Market-to-book is the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Growth is the percentage change in total assets. Return on assets is earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets.  Prior 2-year average ROA is the average annual return on assets for the past two years. Board size is 
the number of directors and supervisors. Board independence is the number of independent directors and supervisors divided by board size. 
Chairman-CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the same person holds both positions. Second largest shareholder is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the second largest shareholder (unrelated to the family) holds one or more positions on the board. 1st generation 
family firm is a dummy variable equal to one if the founder is still involved as a director or manager. 2nd generation family firm is a dummy 
variable if the founder is no longer involved. Acquired family firm is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was acquired and not 
founded by the family. Industry sector dummy variables are one for firms in these industries. Data is from the Taiwan Economic Journal 
database and annual reports. Full descriptive statistics are only reported for continuous variables.  
42 
 
TABLE 3 
Correlations 
Panel A – Family Involvement Variables 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Family Member Directors / Board Size 1.00       
2. Family Representative Directors / Board Size -0.41** 1.00      
3. Family Member Chairman 0.43** -0.30** 1.00     
4. Family Representative Chairman -0.39** 0.37** -0.73** 1.00    
5. Family Member CEO 0.35** -0.25** 0.31** -0.29** 1.00   
6. Family Representative CEO -0.26** 0.31** -0.30** 0.41** -0.24** 1.00  
7. Family Management 0.38** -0.31** 0.37** -0.33** 0.83** -0.27** 1.00 
 
Panel B – Ownership and Financial Variables 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
1. Ownership 1.00                  
2. Control Wedge -0.43** 1.00                 
3. Ln(Total Assets) -0.21** 0.16** 1.00                
4. Ln(Age) 0.16 -0.15** -0.08† 1.00               
5. Debt 0.02 -0.03 -0.58 0.07 1.00              
6. R&D 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.02 1.00             
7. Fixed Assets 0.04 -0.03 -0.26** -0.02 0.41** 0.01 1.00            
8. Market-to-book -0.03 0.10* 0.23** 0.04 -0.38** 0.24** -0.27** 1.00           
9. Growth -0.02 0.06 0.08† -0.20** -0.17** 0.10* 0.01 0.10* 1.00          
10. Return on Assets 0.01 0.06 0.25** -0.13** -0.40** 0.31** -0.27** 0.56** 0.21** 1.00         
11. Prior 2-year ROA 0.02 0.06 0.29** 0.05 -0.35** 0.37** -0.29** 0.47** 0.11** 0.58** 1.00        
12. Board Size -0.19** 0.22** 0.31** -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.04 1.00       
13. Board Independence -0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.41** -0.22** 0.07 -0.11* 0.15** 0.10* 0.17** 0.18** 0.01 1.00      
14. Chairman-CEO duality 0.10* -0.12** -0.13** -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.09* 0.04 0.01 -0.16** -0.01 1.00     
15. 2nd Largest Shareholder -0.22** 0.07 -0.11* -0.07 0.10* 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.16** -0.03 -0.08† 1.00    
16. 1st Generation Family Firm 0.08† -0.27** -0.06 -0.09* -0.13** -0.01 -0.13** 0.05 0.12** 0.12** 0.09* -0.15** 0.13** 0.20** -0.06 1.00   
17. 2nd Generation Family Firm 0.01 0.16** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.01 0.08† -0.07 -0.09* -0.08* -0.06 0.13** -0.13** -0.16** -0.05 -0.70** 1.00  
18. Acquired Family Firm -0.12** 0.17** -0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.09* 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 0.14** -0.48** -0.29** 1.00 
 
Notes: This table displays correlations between family involvement variables and ownership and financial variables. The sample includes 536 family-controlled firms listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange in 2007. See Table 2 notes for variable definitions. Data is from the Taiwan Economic Journal database and annual reports. Significance is denoted as follows: † 10% , * 5%, ** 1%.    
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TABLE 4 
Family Member and Family Representative Involvement 
 
 
All Family 
Involvement 
Family  
Members 
Family  
Representatives 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.41 (-1.54) 
-0.87 
(-2.45)* 
-2.08 
(-3.89)** 
Family Members   -0.25 (-7.08)** 
Family Representatives  -0.12 (-10.42)**  
Ln(Age) 0.16 (4.58)** 
0.32 
(5.94)** 
0.10 
(1.50) 
2nd Generation Family Firm 0.13 (2.99)** 
-0.05 
(-0.91) 
0.42 
(4.14)** 
Control Wedge 0.12 (3.20)** 
-0.09 
(-1.52) 
0.28 
(3.98)** 
Acquired Family Firm 0.07 (0.17) 
-0.38 
(-4.93)** 
0.43 
(3.51)** 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.04 (3.22)** 
0.02 
(1.39) 
0.10 
(3.64)** 
Market-to-book -0.02 (-3.49)** 
-0.03 
(-3.15)** 
-0.04 
(-2.95)** 
R&D 0.04 (1.09) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
0.10 
(1.23) 
Fixed Assets 0.20 (1.91)† 
-0.01 
(0.95) 
0.53 
(2.95)** 
Board Independence  -0.58 (-4.23)** 
-0.26 
(-1.66)† 
-1.51 
(-4.35)** 
2nd Largest Shareholder -0.12 (-2.77)** 
-0.09 
(-1.69)† 
-0.20 
(-2.12)* 
Ownership 0.01 (5.48)** 
0.01 
(3.97)** 
0.01 
(3.92)** 
Board Size 0.06 (8.73)** 
0.09 
(6.93)** 
0.09 
(6.44)** 
Chair-CEO duality -0.03 (-0.84) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(-0.54) 
Prior 2-yr average ROA -0.20 (-1.61) 
-0.12 
(-0.72) 
-0.40 
(1.73)† 
Industry (Electronics) -0.06 (-1.23) 
-0.08 
(-1.56) 
-0.10 
(-0.89) 
Industry (Materials) 0.12 (2.23)* 
0.19 
(2.47)* 
0.26 
(2.03)* 
Industry (Consumer) 0.19 (2.74)** 
0.20 
(2.01)* 
0.37 
(2.66)** 
Industry (Financials) 0.18 (2.30)* 
-0.04 
(-0.25) 
0.15 
(1.06) 
Adj-R2 0.49 0.43 0.44 
n 536 536 536 
 
Notes: Poisson count regressions relating family member, family representative and all family involvement to firm characteristics. The 
sample includes 536 family-controlled firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2007. All family involvement is the sum of the number 
of family members and family representatives. Family members is the number of relatives through blood or marriage holding board or 
management positions. Family representatives is the number of family representatives holding board or CEO positions. Age is the number of 
years since the firm was founded. Second generation family firm is a dummy variable when the founder is not longer involved in the firm. 
Control wedge is the ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling owner. Acquired family firm is a dummy variable equal to one 
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when the firm has been acquired by the family. Total assets is measured in billions of NT dollars. Market-to-book is the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense to sales. Fixed assets is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
Board independence is the number of independent directors and supervisors divided by board size. Second largest shareholder is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the second largest shareholder (unrelated to the family) holds one or more positions on the board. Ownership is 
the cashflow rights ownership of the controlling owner. Board size is the number of directors and supervisors. Chair-CEO duality is a 
dummy variable if the same person holds both positions. Prior 2-year average ROA is the average annual return on assets for the past two 
years. Industry variables are dummies for firms in these industries. Data is from the Taiwan Economic Journal database and annual reports. 
All models include robust standard errors. Z-statistics are show in parentheses. Significance is denoted as follows: † 10% , * 5%, ** 1%.   
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TABLE 5 
Family Member and Representative Involvement as Directors, Chairmen, CEOs and Managers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Family  
Member 
Directors 
/ Board Size 
Family  
Representative 
Directors 
/ Board Size 
Family 
Member 
Chairman 
Family 
Representative 
Chairman 
Family 
Member 
CEO 
Family 
Representative 
CEO 
Family 
 Management 
Intercept 0.089 (0.90) 
-0.58 
(-2.93)** 
-1.26 
(-1.07) 
0.79 
(0.55) 
0.61 
(0.50) 
-1.91 
(-1.27) 
-1.68 
(-1.45) 
Family Member Directors / Board Size   4.11 (4.36)** 
-5.83 
(-4.70)** 
1.27 
(1.69)† 
-1.51 
(-1.26) 
0.88 
(1.20) 
Family Representative Directors / Board Size   0.08 (0.20) 
0.69 
(1.53) 
0.18 
(0.35) 
2.23 
(3.63)** 
-0.62 
(-1.49) 
Family Member Chairman 0.10 (3.59)** 
-0.02 
(-0.54)   
-0.17 
(-0.43) 
0.85 
(1.68)* 
0.59 
(1.80)† 
Family Representative Chairman -0.11 (-2.78)** 
0.17 
(3.09)**   
-0.64 
(-1.04) 
1.65 
(3.39)** 
-0.03 
(-0.07) 
Family Member CEO 0.04 (1.54) 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
0.08 
(0.20) 
-0.63 
(-1.24)   
3.13 
(11.51)** 
Family Representative CEO -0.03 (-0.99) 
0.15 
(2.87)** 
-0.51 
(-1.87)† 
1.05 
(3.46)**   n/a 
Family Management 0.05 (2.31)* 
-0.14 
(-2.91)** 
0.45 
(1.45) 
-0.22 
(-0.48) 
3.10 
(10.97)** n/a  
Ln(Age) 0.07 (5.53)** 
0.02 
(0.98) 
0.11 
(0.83) 
-0.07 
(-0.42) 
-0.10 
(-0.47) 
-0.15 
(-0.73) 
-0.07 
(-0.36) 
2nd Generation Family Firm -0.01 (-0.38) 
0.15 
(4.43)** 
-0.70 
(-3.52)** 
0.20 
(0.70) 
0.09 
(0.39) 
0.25 
(0.75) 
-0.28 
(-1.27) 
Control Wedge -0.02 (-1.53) 
0.10 
(4.15)** 
-0.15 
(-1.10) 
0.37 
(2.01)* 
0.09 
(0.47) 
0.11 
(0.50) 
-0.26 
(-1.35) 
Acquired Family Firm -0.08 (-4.41)** 
0.16 
(4.14)** 
-0.36 
(-1.62) 
-0.17 
(-0.57) 
0.40 
(1.30) 
0.69 
(2.00)* 
-0.81 
(-2.75)** 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.01 (-0.80) 
0.04 
(3.64)** 
0.09 
(1.38) 
-0.11 
(-1.22) 
-0.22 
(-3.55)** 
-0.11 
(-1.32) 
0.09 
(1.37) 
Market-to-book -0.01 (-1.87)† 
-0.01 
(-1.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.06 
(-1.25) 
-0.05 
(-1.14) 
0.02 
(0.52) 
-0.02 
(-0.40) 
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R&D 0.01 (0.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.21) 
-0.33 
(-2.30)* 
0.53 
(2.67)** 
0.07 
(0.36) 
-0.12 
(-0.53) 
-0.07 
(-0.35) 
Fixed Assets -0.06 (-1.62) 
0.25 
(3.14)** 
0.32 
(0.81) 
-0.33 
(-0.66) 
0.05 
(1.13) 
0.67 
(1.38) 
-1.42 
(-2.32)* 
Board Independence  0.01 (0.05) 
-0.47 
(-4.53)** 
0.48 
(0.68) 
-0.93 
(-0.98) 
-0.45 
(-0.56) 
2.99 
(3.04)** 
-0.74 
(-0.91) 
2nd Largest Shareholder -0.02 (-1.02) 
-0.07 
(-2.13)* 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
0.46 
(1.90)† 
0.29 
(1.03) 
-0.55 
(-1.56) 
-0.26 
(-1.17) 
Ownership 0.01 (2.52)* 
0.01 
(3.22)** 
0.01 
(0.59) 
0.01 
(1.33) 
0.01 
(1.15) 
-0.01 
(-0.32) 
-0.01 
(-1.39) 
Board Size -0.01 (-0.87) 
-0.01 
(-2.51)* 
-0.02 
(-0.41) 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
0.02 
(0.46) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.01 
(-0.29) 
Chairman-CEO duality -0.05 (-2.74)** 
0.05 
(1.34) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.47 
(-1.63) 
1.61 
(7.03)** 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.13 
(0.42) 
Prior 2-yr average ROA -0.01 (-0.34) 
-0.13 
(-1.58) 
0.56 
(1.43) 
-0.58 
(-1.28) 
1.09 
(1.79)* 
1.46 
(2.07)* 
-0.33 
(-0.61) 
Industry (Electronics) -0.03 (-2.13)* 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
0.07 
(0.34) 
0.12 
(0.40) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.46 
(-1.41) 
0.08 
(0.35) 
Industry (Materials) 0.07 (2.52)* 
0.03 
(0.61) 
-0.45 
(-1.41) 
0.84 
(2.30)* 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.69 
(-1.10) 
-0.07 
(-0.20) 
Industry (Consumer) 0.01 (0.33) 
0.14 
(1.90)† 
0.25 
(0.75) 
-0.58 
(-1.37) 
-0.08 
(-0.22) n/a 
0.35 
(0.94) 
Industry (Financials) -0.01 (-0.05) 
0.09 
(1.58) 
-0.18 
(-0.48) 
0.90 
(1.82)† 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.28 
(0.62) 
0.20 
(0.42) 
Log Likelihood 197.72 -188.88      
McFadden R2   0.36 0.52 0.72 0.44 0.69 
n 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 
 
Notes: Tobit and probit models relate family member and representative involvement as directors, Chairmen, CEOs and managers to firm characteristics. The sample includes 536 family-controlled firms listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2007. Family member directors are family members (through blood or marriage) holding director or supervisor positions on the board. Family representative directors are non-family member 
representatives of the family’s listed and unlisted entities holding director or supervisor positions on the board. Family member chairman is a dummy variable equal to one if a family member holds the chairman 
position. Family representative chairman is a dummy variable equal to one if a family representative holds the chairman position. Family member CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if a family member holds the 
CEO position. Family representative CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if a family representative holds the CEO position. Family management is a dummy variable equal to one when a family member holds a non-
CEO position in top management. Age is the number of years since the firm was founded. Second generation family firm is a dummy variable when the founder is not longer involved in the firm. Control wedge is the 
ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling owner. Acquired family firm is a dummy variable equal to one when the firm has been acquired by the family. Total assets is measured in billions of NT dollars. 
Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense to sales. Fixed assets is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Board independence is the number of 
independent directors and supervisors divided by board size. Second largest shareholder is a dummy variable equal to one when the second largest shareholder (unrelated to the family) holds one or more positions on 
the board. Ownership is the cashflow rights ownership of the controlling owner. Board size is the number of directors and supervisors. Chair-CEO duality is a dummy variable if the same person holds both positions. 
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Prior 2-year average ROA is the average annual return on assets for the past two years. Industry variables are dummies for firms in these industries. Data is from the Taiwan Economic Journal database and annual 
reports. All models include robust standard errors. Z-statistics are show in parentheses. Significance is denoted as follows: † 10% , * 5%, ** 1%.   
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TABLE 6 
Family Member and Representative Involvement and Firm Performance 
 
 Return on Assets (%) ROA 3-yr 
Stock 
Return 
Return 
3-yr 
Market-to-
book 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 13.77 (1.35) 
16.47 
(1.67)† 
13.86 
(1.36) 
15.75 
(1.51) 
-25.44 
(-1.83)† 
-22.79 
(-0.82) 
-12.02 
(-0.71) 
4.73 
(2.80)** 
All Family Involvement -0.40 (-1.88)†        
Family Members  -0.39 (-1.03) 
-0.62 
(-1.69)†      
Family Representatives   -0.35 (-1.45)      
Family Member Directors / Board Size     -7.39 (-1.86)† 
-9.01 
(-2.35)* 
-19.71 
(-1.71)† 
-15.17 
(-2.65)** 
-2.34 
(-3.16)** 
Family Representative Directors / Board Size     -4.20 (-1.41) 
-8.29 
(-2.66)** 
-3.60 
(-0.47) 
-4.89 
(-1.14) 
-1.41 
(-2.91)** 
Family Member Chairman    1.25 (0.55) 
1.27 
(0.64) 
0.70 
(-0.15) 
1.26 
(0.42) 
-0.35 
(-1.04) 
Family Representative Chairman    -1.88 (-0.57) 
-3.10 
(-0.92) 
-15.95 
(-2.09)* 
0.51 
(0.12) 
-0.76 
(-1.59) 
Family Member CEO    0.33 (0.15) 
2.55 
(1.14) 
-9.32 
(-1.56) 
1.48 
(0.52) 
-0.15 
(-0.37) 
Family Representative CEO    2.99 (0.87) 
5.73 
(1.76)† 
3.17 
(0.41) 
4.70 
(0.96) 
0.14 
(0.29) 
Family Management    -1.15 (-0.50) 
-1.45 
(-0.62) 
2.11 
(0.39) 
0.22 
(0.08) 
-0.22 
(-0.53) 
Ownership 0.02 (0.30) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.32) 
0.02 
(0.40) 
0.05 
(0.89) 
0.03 
(0.27) 
-0.07 
(-0.95) 
0.01 
(0.70) 
Control Wedge 0.54 (0.47) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.33 
(0.30) 
0.48 
(0.44) 
1.66 
(1.45) 
2.23 
(0.69) 
0.21 
(0.12) 
0.39 
(1.92)† 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.59 (0.99) 
0.49 
(0.84) 
0.58 
(0.98) 
0.61 
(1.00) 
1.94 
(3.23)** 
2.06 
(1.43) 
1.14 
(1.44) 
-0.02 
(-0.19) 
Ln(Age) -3.37 (-2.11)* 
-3.49 
(-2.09)* 
-3.27 
(-1.96)* 
-3.26 
(-1.90)† 
1.56 
(0.70) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
3.13 
(1.36) 
0.67 
(3.16)** 
Debt -14.66 -15.01 -14.63 13.86 -9.54 -10.73 -4.74 -2.69 
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(-4.33)** (-4.53)** (-4.32)** (-3.83)** (-2.82)** (-1.35) (-1.18) (-5.42)** 
Fixed Assets -10.63 (-2.09)* 
-11.46 
(-2.25)* 
-10.89 
(-2.08)* 
-11.59 
(-2.20)* 
-14.99 
(-3.13)** 
-7.03 
(-0.57) 
-10.98 
(-1.64)† 
-2.39 
(-3.77)** 
R&D 10.09 (5.93)** 
10.08 
(5.84)** 
10.06 
(5.83)** 
10.04 
(5.67)** 
12.69 
(7.34)** 
14.85 
(3.79)** 
8.87 
(4.64)** 
1.29 
(5.57)** 
Growth 0.04 (2.64)** 
0.04 
(2.61)** 
0.04 
(2.60)** 
0.04 
(2.67)** 
0.04 
(1.52) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
0.07 
(3.12)** 
0.01 
(0.90) 
Board Size 0.37 (1.82)† 
0.29 
(1.51) 
0.41 
(2.00)* 
0.12 
(0.64) 
-0.09 
(-0.42) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.12 
(-0.44) 
-0.03 
(-0.79) 
Board Independence  3.25 (0.68) 
4.31 
(0.93) 
3.36 
(0.70) 
2.52 
(0.51) 
12.10 
(2.50)* 
-21.30 
(-1.51) 
6.20 
(0.91) 
1.44 
(1.53) 
Chairman-CEO duality 1.86 (1.45) 
2.00 
(1.57) 
1.91 
(1.48) 
1.94 
(1.33) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
7.82 
(1.80)† 
2.0 
(0.95) 
-0.08 
(-0.29) 
2nd Largest Shareholder -1.46 (-1.06) 
-1.27 
(-0.92) 
-1.48 
(-1.07) 
-1.47 
(-1.02) 
-0.99 
(-0.64) 
1.73 
(0.43) 
-0.10 
(-0.05) 
0.10 
(0.39) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.08 0.17 0.24 
n 536 536 536 536 536 516 500 536 
 
Notes: Regressions relate return on assets (%) and other measures of firm performance to family member and family representative involvement and control variables. The sample includes 536 family-controlled firms 
listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2007. Return on assets is earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets as a percentage. ROA 3-yr is three-year average annual return on assets as a percentage. Stock 
return is 1-year buy-and-hold return as a percentage. Return 3-yr is three-year average annual stock return as a percentage. Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. All family 
involvement is the sum of the number of family members and family representatives. Family members is the number of relatives through blood or marriage holding board or management positions. Family 
representatives is the number of family representatives holding board or CEO positions. Family member directors are family members holding director or supervisor positions on the board. Family representative 
directors are family representatives holding director or supervisor positions on the board. Family member chairman is a dummy variable equal to one if a family member holds the chairman position. Family 
representative chairman is a dummy variable equal to one if a family representative holds the chairman position. Family member CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if a family member holds the CEO position. 
Family representative CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if a family representative holds the CEO position. Family management is a dummy variable equal to one when a family member holds a non-CEO position 
in top management. Ownership is the cashflow rights ownership of the controlling owner. Control wedge is the ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling owner. Total assets is measured in billions of NT 
dollars. Age is the number of years since the firm was founded. Debt is total liabilities divided by total assets. Fixed assets is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense to sales. Growth is 
the percentage change in total assets. Board size is the number of directors and supervisors. Board independence is the number of independent directors and supervisors divided by board size. Chairman-CEO duality is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the same person holds both positions. Second largest shareholder is a dummy variable equal to one when the second largest shareholder (unrelated to the family) holds one or more 
positions on the board. Data is from the Taiwan Economic Journal database and annual reports. All models include robust standard errors. T-statistics are show in parentheses. Significance is denoted as follows: † 10% 
, * 5%, ** 1%.   
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TABLE 7 
Family Generation, Founders and Excess Directors 
 
 
Return  
on Assets 
ROA 
3-yr 
Stock 
Return 
Return 
3-yr 
Market-
to- 
book 
Panel A – Generation of Family Directors 
Family Member Directors 1st / Board Size -4.47 (-0.92) 
-0.49 
(-0.10) 
1.67 
(0.11) 
-7.31 
(-0.93) 
-0.83 
(-0.83) 
Family Member Directors 2nd  / Board Size -8.55 (-1.86)† 
-12.09 
(-2.78)** 
-28.11 
(-2.12)* 
-18.79 
(-2.82)** 
-2.65 
(-3.20)** 
Family Member Directors 3rd / Board Size -6.84 (-1.73)† 
-8.44 
(-1.84)† 
-15.86 
(-0.88) 
-12.06 
(-1.64)† 
-3.10 
(-2.71)** 
Family Representative Directors / Board Size -3.74 (-1.27) 
-6.91 
(-2.23)* 
-0.35 
(-0.05) 
-3.70 
(-0.86) 
-1.20 
(-2.43)* 
Panel B – Founder Chairmen & CEOs 
Family Founder Chairman 2.02 (1.59) 
3.24 
(2.47)* 
8.85 
(2.53)* 
4.41 
(2.28)* 
0.32 
(1.36) 
Family Non-Founder Chairman -0.69 (-0.51) 
-1.52 
(-1.19) 
-4.50 
(-1.29) 
-3.71 
(-2.00)* 
-0.30 
(-1.28) 
Family Representative Chairman -2.90 (-0.99) 
-4.14 
(-1.39) 
-15.36 
(-2.20)* 
-0.57 
(-0.17) 
-0.48 
(-1.16) 
Family Founder CEO 0.40 (0.25) 
3.07 
(1.93)† 
1.52 
(0.31) 
2.80 
(1.15) 
0.25 
(0.82) 
Family Non-Founder CEO -0.31 (-0.20) 
-1.84 
(-1.29) 
-7.03 
(-1.58) 
-2.11 
(-0.87) 
-0.36 
(-1.16) 
Family Representative CEO 2.96 (0.86) 
5.53 
(1.70)† 
3.93 
(0.50) 
4.57 
(0.94) 
0.15 
(0.32) 
Panel C – Expected versus Excess Directors 
Expected Family Member Directors -2.77 (-0.22) 
-15.31 
(-1.24) 
-63.63 
(-1.72)† 
-22.45 
(-1.04) 
-0.62 
(-0.26) 
Expected Family Representative Directors -18.27 (-0.80) 
-32.77 
(-1.60) 
-60.45 
(-1.24) 
-20.01 
(-0.75) 
-0.26 
(-0.09) 
Excess Family Member Directors -14.93 (-3.04)** 
-14.72 
(-3.16)** 
-18.85 
(-1.25) 
-16.92 
(-2.49)* 
-2.81 
(-2.99)** 
Excess Family Representative Directors -2.92 (-0.88) 
-5.84 
(-1.67)† 
0.14 
(0.02) 
-3.43 
(-0.74) 
-1.47 
(-2.73)** 
 
Notes: This table displays selected regression coefficients from specifications 4-8 in Table 6. In Panel A, family member directors are 
separated into 1st, 2nd and 3rd generation family members. Each column is one specification. In Panel B, founder, non-founder and 
representative chairmen and CEOs are identified individually. Each cell is one specification. In Panel C, family and representative directors 
are separated into expected and excess directors. Each column is one specification. Coefficients for other variables in the models are not 
reported. The sample includes 536 family-controlled firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2007. Return on assets is earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets as a percentage. ROA 3-yr is three-year average annual return on assets as a percentage. Stock return 
is 1-year buy-and-hold return as a percentage. Return 3-yr is three-year average annual stock return as a percentage. Market-to-book is the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Family member directors 1st is the number of 1st generation family member 
directors. Family member directors 2nd is the number of 2nd generation family member directors. Family member directors 3rd is the number 
of 3rd generation family member directors. Family representative directors are family representatives holding director or supervisor positions 
on the board. Family founder chairman is a dummy equal to one if the chairman is a founding family member. Family non-founder chairman 
is a dummy equal to one if the chairman is a non-founding family member. Family representative chairman is a dummy variable equal to 
one if a family representative holds the chairman position. Family founder CEO is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is a founding family 
member. Family non-founder CEO is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is a non-founding family member. Family representative CEO is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a family representative holds the CEO position. Expected family member directors are the proportion of 
family member directors up to the proportion of family ownership. Expected family representative directors are the proportion of family 
representative directors (after including family member directors) up to the proportion of family ownership. Excess family member directors 
are the proportion of family member directors above the proportion of family ownership. Excess family representative directors are the 
proportion of family representative directors (after including family member directors) above the proportion of family ownership. Data is 
from the Taiwan Economic Journal database and annual reports. All models include robust standard errors. T-statistics are show in 
parentheses. Significance is denoted as follows: † 10% , * 5%, ** 1%.   
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FIGURE 1 
Family Member and Representative Involvement in U-Ming Marine Transport Corporation in 2007 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                            
1
 Further explanation of family representatives is provided at the start of the literature review and hypothesis 
development section. 
2
 There is no special reason for selecting the year 2007 as our sample period. This was the most recent data 
available when we started this project. The results are not expected to be influenced by the selection of the 
sample year as family involvement is generally stable over time. 
3
 Taiwan’s Corporations Law allows institutional shareholders to elect directors and supervisors, so it is 
common for controlling groups to hold board positions through direct ownership and indirect ownership (other 
listed and unlisted entities controlled by the same group). This allows us to identify family representatives as 
there is documented evidence that they are representing the shareholdings of another entity which is controlled 
by the same family.  
4
 Article 9-9 of Taiwan Stock Exchange Listing Rules.  
5
 Sourced from Asian Corporate Governance Association Taiwan White Paper (February 2011).  
6
 Article 198 of Corporations Law in Taiwan previously stated that without a specific company governance rule 
stating otherwise, all companies should follow cumulative voting in director elections. On 14 December 2011, 
this discretion was removed to make cumulative voting mandatory.   
7
 We do not impose minimum ownership restrictions as Fiegener (2010) explains that what makes family firms 
different from non-family firms is not the existence of a substantial shareholder but the involvement of the 
family in business decisions that infuses the family’s aspirations and values into the business. We do not classify 
a group of independent directors as a controlling group.  
8
 Due to variation in the disclosure of management positions (min=1, max=28) we are only able to use a dummy 
variable to represent family member involvement in non-CEO top management positions.  
9
 To remove the potential influence of extreme observations, the following variables were winsorized at the 99th 
percentile – Wedge, Debt, R&D, Fixed Assets, Market-to-Book and Growth. Growth was also winsorized at the 
1st percentile. 
10 Independent directors are identified by firms based on guidelines provided in the Taiwan Corporate 
Governance Best Practice Principles. The board of directors can be comprised of family members, family 
representatives, independent directors and other directors (including representatives of large shareholders and 
other non-family-related, non-independent directors).  
11
 In a few cases where the controlling family group is the second largest shareholder, this variable represents 
the presence of the largest shareholder on the board. 
12
 In six sample firms there is only one family member or family representative involved. These are classified as 
family controlled firms, based on our definition, as the founding family holds the same number of board seats 
(one) as all other individuals on the board. In addition, in each of these cases the family that founded the firm is 
still the largest shareholder and holds the Chairman position. Inclusion or exclusion of these firms has no affect 
on the reported results.  
13
 In specifications 6 and 7, coefficients on family management, industry (consumer) and family representative 
CEO are not possible due to no variation between the dependent and independent variables.  
14
 The coefficient on Family Member CEO is insignificant in specifications 1-4 due to its high correlation (.83) 
with Family Management. If Family Management is removed from the regression then Family Member CEO is 
significant in each specification.  
15
 The one exception is a positive relationship between family member chairman and family representative CEO 
in specification 6. This indicates that some family firms do pair family member chairmen with family 
representative CEOs.  
16
 We use a 3-year average approach to ROA and stock returns rather than extending the sample to three years 
as family involvement variables have little variation over time, which would mean using three years of 
observations would improve the significance of our results, without adding additional cross-sectional variation.  
17
 Combs et al. (2010) provides evidence of omitted variable bias in examining CEO compensation in family 
firms. While prior studies document lower compensation for family CEOs, their study shows that this is only the 
case when family CEOs are complemented by family directors or managers. When family CEOs are the only 
family representative their compensation is higher than non-family CEOs. 
18
 The coefficients on family representative directors are significantly higher (more positive) than the 
coefficients on 2nd generation family member directors for stock returns (t=1.99), 3-year average stock returns 
(t=2.28) and market-to-book (t=1.72).  
19
 This analysis is also important as a robustness check because another potential explanation for the less 
negative relationship between family representative directors and firm performance could be that family 
representative directors are more likely to hold positions on the board after family member directors have 
already obtained effective control of the board.  
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20
 We believe this is a reasonable assumption as families are likely to allocate board seats to suitable family 
members first and then to family representatives, rather than to representatives first and then family members. 
21
 One exception is a significant negative correlation between the second generation family firm dummy and 
return on assets as documented in Table 3. However, even in this case the correlation between the acquired 
family firm dummy and return on assets is insignificant.  
